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American Federalism and the Abstention




II. Public Utility Regulation







Judicial history in the past three decades has been marked by
an increase in federal-state conflict as a result of the federal ju-
diciary's extension of constitutional protections in the area of
personal liberties. The Supreme Court has developed several tech-
niques designed to minimize such conflict. One such technique
has been the development of the doctrine of abstention.
The abstention doctrine was first enunciated in Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.' Appellant sought an injunction
* A.B., 1940, M.A., 1942, University of California at Los Angeles; Ph. D.,
1951, University of Pennsylvania; L.L.B., 1952, Temple University; Pro-
fessor of Political Science, Temple University; Member of the Federal and
Pennsylvania Bars.
1. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
against a Texas Railroad Commission order which permitted trains
having one Pullman car to operate with a Negro porter instead of
a white Pullman conductor. It alleged violations of the Equal
Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitu-
tion. Reversing the lower court injunction, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter held the exercise of federal jurisdiction in abeyance by giv-
ing preference to the interpretation of state issues by judges. He
recognized that a federal ruling prior to state judicial determina-
tion would be premature and violate the policy of avoiding such
interference.
The concept of abstention was born out of a regard for the
independent role of the state judiciary and a federal judicial belief
in self-limitation. The purpose was to foster harmony between
levels of government. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:
It [the complaint of the Pullman porters] touches a sensi-
tive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication
is open. Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be
avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue would termi-
nate the controversy.
2
The doctrine has been applied to civil rights, public utility
regulation, regulation of interstate commerce, taxation, land use
regulation and creditors' rights, each of which will be examined in
detail. The purpose of this article is to examine the development
of the abstention doctrine in the areas enumerated over the last
quarter of a century and to analyze its role in judicial decision-
making under our federal system.3
Civm LIBERTIES
The Supreme Court originally applied the abstention principle
to civil rights cases by refusing to intervene prematurely in state
2. Id. at 498.
3. The significance of the doctrine may be seen in Table 1 showing
the increase in the number of opinions of the Court involving its appli-
cation. Except for the five-year period of 1951-1955, when only four re-
ported opinions dealt with abstention, an average of thirteen cases for all
other five-year periods were argued or decided on abstention principles.
Table 1
U.S. Supreme Court Cases Involving Abstention, 1941-1968








Application of the doctrine has not been confined to minor issues, but
has been applied to such sensitive areas of constitutional development as
civil rights, freedom of speech and religion, loyalty oaths, illegal searches
and seizures, interstate commerce and to issues of taxation, public utility
regulation, creditors' rights and other important subjects as seen in Table 2.
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judicial processes. The unsatisfactory results of such abstention
became apparent, and later cases evidence an abandonment or
delimitation of the doctrine.
In Douglas v. Jeannette,4 petitioners, Jehovah Witnesses,
sought a federal injunction against criminal prosecution for distrib-
uting and attempting to sell religious literature without complying
with the requirement of obtaining a municipal license. Mr. Chief
Justice Stone affirming the district court judgment holding the
ordinance unconstitutional, said equity jurisdiction to restrain en-
forcement of criminal sanctions would be allowed only in excep-
tional cases. The normal policy of the federal courts was to refuse
to interfere in state administration of justice. 5 Mr. Justices Jack-
son and Frankfurther dissented on other substantive grounds.
Abstention was applied in Local 103, Alabama State Feder-
ation of Labor v. McAdory to defer consideration of an Alabama
statute which required union officials to file registration state-
ments and annual reports. The union officials petitioned a federal
district court to declare the state statute unconstitutional. In
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court relied upon the prin-
ciple of avoiding needless construction of state constitutions and
the power of a federal court in equity to exercise discretion in
Table 2
Subject Matter Involved in Supreme Court Abstention Litigation
Subject Involved Number of Cases % of Total
Civil Rights 23 37.1
Taxation 6 9.6
Land Use 7 11.3
Regulation of Public Utilities 5 8.1
Interstate Commerce 5 8.1
Creditors' Rights 5 8.1
Contractual Relations 3 4.8
Miscellaneous 8 12.9
62 100.1
A little less than one-third of the cases have involved civil rights
issues while more than half of the remaining number involved important
economic issues regulating various private property rights. The Court
has applied abstention in twenty-six or 41.9% of the cases in which the
issue has been involved.
Table 3
The Application of Abstention in the Supreme Court
Total Number of Cases 62
Number of Cases in which
Abstention was Applied 26
Percentage of Cases in which
Abstention was Applied 41.9
4. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
5. Id.
6. 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
declaratory judgment proceedings. A similar conclusion was
reached in AFL v. Watson.7 There petitioners sought a federal
injunction against a 1941 amendment to the Florida constitution
which provided that the right to work could not be denied because
of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization. The
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, remanded the case
to the district court pending state court determination of the
issue. The majority feared the impossibility of authoritatively
determining the future state decision might render a prior federal
ruling a mere advisory opinion. In his dissent, Mr. Chief Justice
Stone preferred to dismiss the entire federal proceeding to permit
uninterrupted state judicial action since he found no irreparable
damage flowing from state enforcement of its statute. Dissenting
separately, Mr. Justice Murphy disagreed with the application of
abstention since the statute presented important constitutional
issues with no question of varying state interpretation. Mr. Justice
Murphy's concern was that there would be little constitutional pro-
tection in any subsequent recourse to the federal courts if the
Florida courts ruled against the appellants after abstention had
been applied.
The Court continued its broad application of the abstention
principle in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court.8 The case involved
the constitutionality of a Los Angeles ordinance which required
solicitors of funds for religious purposes to provide information to
prevent fraudulent solicitation. The Court refused to review on
the grounds that the constitutional issue had not been sufficiently
refined. In so doing the Court abstained in favor of the highest
state court. Dissenting, Mr. Justices Murphy and Douglas believed
the constitutional issues were sufficiently crystallized to warrant
full disposal.
In Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po Corp.,9 the Court re-
viewed a petition to enjoin a Hawaiian territorial statute which
limited the teaching of any language other than English. Ab-
stention was justified because:
[W] here equitable interference with state and territorial
acts is sought in federal courts, judicial consideration of acts
of importance primarily to the people of a state or territory
should, as a matter of discretion, be left by the federal
courts to the courts of the legislating authority unless
exceptional circumstances command a different course.
We find no such circumstances in this case.'0
Mr. Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge dissented.
The Court applied abstention in Albertson v. Millard,1 and
7. 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
8. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
9. 336 U.S. 368 (1948).
10. Id. at 383, 384.
11. 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
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refused to review the constitutionality of the 1952 Michigan Com-
munist Control Act after the federal district court upheld its va-
lidity. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held it appropriate that
the state court first consider the issue since no prior state court
interpretation existed. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas distin-
guished Albertson from the Rescue Army case since the issue in
Albertson was concrete, ripe, ready for adjudication and no further
state court clarification was possible.
The abstention principle by affording an opportunity to avoid
an adverse final judgment encouraged the multiplication of suits.
This undesirable consequence was present in Government Civic
Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor.12 Employees
of the Alabama Beverage Control Board, alleging violation of their
constitutional rights, sought a federal injunction against the en-
forcement of an Alabama statute which provided that any public
employee who joined or participated in a labor union would for-
feit his rights, benefits, and privileges of public employment. A
federal district court withheld jurisdiction for a reasonable time to
permit the exhaustion of state remedies. Thereafter the union
commenced its action on non-constitutional grounds in the state
courts which found the union was covered by the statute and re-
fused to grant relief. The union then returned to the district court
which dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court
vacated the lower court judgment and remanded the case with
direction to retain jurisdiction until state court adjudication was
exhausted since the constitutional issue had not been decided in
the state court.
13
With growing disagreement, the Court applied the abstention
doctrine in Harrison v. NAACP 14 after hearing constitutional chal-
lenges against five Virginia statutes designed to prevent the en-
forcement of civil rights. The Court vacated the district court
judgment which held all five statutes unconstitutional, three as
violative of the fourteenth amendment and two as vague and
ambiguous. Mr. Justice Harlan justified abstention on the grounds
that the decision involved a postponement, not an abdication, of
federal jurisdiction. He reasoned postponement best served the
principle of comity inherent in the federal system and would
ultimately spare the Court unnecessary constitutional adjudication.
12. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
13. The undesirable consequences ultimately became apparent and
the abstention principle was delimited further in England v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See text accom-
panying note 35 infra.
14. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
He was careful, however, to delimit the implication of applying
the doctrine:
We do not intimate the slightest view as to what effect
such determinations might have upon the validity of these
statutes. All we hold is that these enactments should
be exposed to state construction or limiting interpretation
before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their
constitutionality, so that the federal judgment will be
based upon something that is a complete product of the
State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as
construed by its highest court.15
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, observed that although the
original justification for the doctrine was expanded unreasonably
to offer a convenient excuse for staying federal jurisdiction, it
delayed ultimate decision, doubled litigation costs, and diminished
the stature of the federal courts. The dissenting Justices believed
the plenary jurisdiction over deprivations of civil rights given to
the district courts under the Civil Rights Act 6 should not be
diluted by the abstention principle. They saw no reasons for
deferring to the state courts. "Where state laws make such an
assault as these do on our decisions and a State has spoken
defiantly against the constitutional rights of the citizens, reasons
for showing deference to local institutionals vanish."' 7  Relying
upon Harrison, the Court in a per curiam opinion abstained in
NAACP v. Bennett." Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented advocating dis-
posal of the constitutional issues. In Monroe v. Pape,"' however,
the Court refused to abstain from considering whether Chicago
police officers violated a federal statute 20 when they broke into and
searched the plaintiff's home without a warrant. The Court held
that fourteenth amendment rights had been invaded. The gross-
ness of the violation was a material factor in the Court's con-
clusion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent disclosed the bases for
the doctrine:
Self-limitation is not a matter of technical nicety, nor
judicial timidity. It reflects the recognition that to no
small degree the effectiveness of the legal order depends
upon the infrequency with which it solves its problems by
resorting to determinations of ultimate power.21
The Supreme Court returned to application of the abstention
principle in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGin-
15. Id. at 178.
16. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1964).
17. 360 U.S. 167, 182 (1959).
18. 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
20. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
21. 365 U.S. 167, 241 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
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ley.22 In that case the appellant sought to restrain enforcement
of the Pennsylvania Sunday Closing Law. 23 The Court, citing
Pullman, unanimously affirmed the district court's refusal to pass
on the constitutional issues presented because there were un-
settled questions of state law.
The dissenting Justices in Harrison gained support for their
refusal to abstain in Garner v. Louisiana.24 Negroes, who refused
to vacate lunch counter seats reserved for whites, sought a review
of their conviction contending the evidence failed to show a vio-
lation of the state criminal code definition of "disturbing the
peace."25 Reversing the conviction, the Court assumed the state
court would construe the statute liberally to include a common
law concept of disturbing the peace, which required proof of an
imminent danger of outward provocation. The Court also adopted
the state court interpretation that the actor must have conducted
himself in an unruly manner.2 6 Applying these principles, the
Court decided the conviction violated the fourteenth amendment
since there was no evidence to support the arrest. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, an advocate of abstention, concurred, rationalizing
"this Court must extrapolate its allowable meaning and attribute
that to the highest court of the State."21  Concurring separately,
Mr. Justice Douglas believed reversal of the convictions was justi-
fied under the state action theory of the fourteenth amendment.
While Mr. Justice Harlan sharply disagreed with the majority, he
concurred with its conclusion because, under Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,28 the defendants were exercising their constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of expression which could not be punished by a
general breach of peace statute. He also found the statute vague
and uncertain as applied to the defendants. His basic conflict
with the majority was over its assumption of the decision-making
role:
Moreover, the kind of speculation in which this Court has
indulged as to the meaning of the Louisiana statute is
surely out of keeping with the principle that federal
courts should abstain from constitutional decisions in-
volving doubtful state law questions until a clarifying
adjudication on them has first been obtained from the
state courts [citations omitted]. If there be doubt as to
22. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
24. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
25. LA. CRIM. CODE tit. 14, § 103 (1951).
26. 203 La. 961, 14 So. 2d 778 (1943).
27. 368 U.S. 157, 174 (1961).
28. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
how the statute was construed in this respect, the cases
should be returned to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
clarification of its judgment.
2 9
The Court refused to abstain in McNeese v. Board of Edu-
cation0 even though the available state administrative remedy had
not been exhausted. Plaintiff challenged the validity of school
boundaries drawn to make an exclusively Negro school district.
The Court determined the boundaries were in violation of the Civil
Rights Act3 1 and an Illinois statute.8 2 Speaking for the Court, Mr.
Justice Douglas found neither an underlying state issue nor any
federal right interwoven with state law which needed to be un-
ravelled before the Court could proceed. He reasoned that it was
not clearly established that the state administrative remedy af-
forded such relief as would justify applying abstention. Dissent-
ing, Mr. Justice Harlan, citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 83 distin-
guished the typical school segregation case from McNeese since
McNeese dealt with the formation of school district boundaries, a
matter better left to local authorities than to federal officials.
After McNeese the Court was faced with the problem of re-
solving split litigation in light of the Windsor rule.34 In England
v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,35 graduates of
chiropractic schools, seeking to practice in Louisiana without com-
plying with statutory requirements, sought a federal injunction
to restrain enforcement of the statute. The district court invoked
abstention, stayed proceedings and retained jurisdiction until the
Louisiana Supreme Court determined whether the statute was
applicable. After the state supreme court had upheld the appli-
cation of the statute to the petitioners, the federal district court
dismissed the action because the state court had passed on all issues.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed permitting counsel's
return to the lower federal court for determination of federal issues
because of the misinterpretation of the Windsor rule. At the same
time Mr. Justice Brennan announced prospective application of the
following principle: When the plaintiff freely and unreservedly
submits federal claims to state courts, he makes an election to
forgo his right to return to the federal courts. If, however, the
federal claim is merely presented, the plaintiff retains his right to
return. While he concurred in the conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas
thought the Brennan rule would be a legal booby-trap because of
its unfamiliar interpretation. More serious was his concern that
the announced rule would force the litigant to try his entire case
29. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
30. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
31. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
32. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 122, § 22-19 (1961).
33. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
34. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
35. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme Court
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
in the state court when all requirements were fulfilled. His
comments indicated the Court's reevaluation of the doctrine:
I was a member of the Court that launched Pullman and
sent it on its way. But if I had realized the creature it was
to become, my doubts would have been far deeper than
they were. . . . The case was started in May 1957 and
here we are nearly seven years later without a decision
on the merits.
That seems like an unnecessary price to pay for our
federalism. Referral to state courts for declaratory ruling
on state law questions is said to encourage a smooth
operation of our federalism, as it may avoid clashes be-
tween the two systems. But there always have been
clashes and always will be; and the influence of the
Pullman doctrine has, I think, been de minimis. More-
over, the complexity of local law to federal judges is in-
herent in the federal court system as designed by Congress.
Resolution of local law questions is implicit in diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. 6
The impact of Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring comments are
seen in the Court's non-abstention in Griffin v. County School
Board.37 Prince Edward County awarded a per capita school sub-
sidy to private schools operating on a segregated basis. The district
court refused to abstain to await a state court declaratory judg-
ment on the constitutional issue. Mr. Justice Black, delivering the
Court's opinion, ordered the reopening of the county public schools
on an integrated basis. The Pullman principle was not applied
because the state court had already examined the issue and a further
delay, after three years of litigation, would not be countenanced.
Mr. Justices Clark and Harlan concurred, although they disagreed
with the ruling that federal courts were empowered to order the
reopening of county schools.
The trend toward non-abstention continued in Baggett v.
Bullitt8  where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a 1931
University of Washington faculty oath requirement and a 1955 state
employee loyalty oath statute. The contention that the Court
should abstain because the 1931 statute had not been construed by
the state courts was expressly rejected in Mr. Justice White's
majority opinion. He believed abstention was not an automatic
rule to be applied whenever the Court was faced with a doubtful
issue of state law: "[It rather involved a discretionary exercise
36. Id. at 425, 426.
37. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
38. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
of a court's equity powers. Ascertainment of whether there existed
the 'special circumstances' . . . prerequisite to its application must
be made on a case to case basis."' 9 Such exceptional circumstances
were not deemed present since the constitutional issue still re-
mained and further state proceedings would only cause additional
delay. Mr. Justices Clark and Harlan dissented, believing the state
court should have been given a prior opportunity to construe the
1931 statute.
The Court next rejected abstention in Davis v. Mann,40 where
a Virginia reapportionment scheme was found to violate the prin-
ciple of Reynolds v. Sims. 41 Mr. Chief Justice Warren ruled ab-
stention was inapplicable because federal jurisdiction was prop-
erly invoked and the state constitution and statute were unam-
biguous so that no need existed for prior state adjudication.
Similar reasoning on non-constitutional grounds was utilized
in Bell v. Maryland.42 The Court vacated a state court conviction
of Negro students arrested under a Maryland criminal trespass
statute for refusing to leave an eating place after being refused
service because of their color. Before the highest state court re-
viewed their conviction, the Maryland legislature passed a public
accommodation statute which would have rendered their conduct
legal. Delivering the Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan refused
to apply abstention resting his opinion on a state rule that con-
victions not affirmed by the highest state court are forgiven by
the passage of a new statute. Mr. Justices Black, Harlan and
White dissented from the Court's refusal to base its decision upon
constitutional grounds. The dissenting Justices preferred to have
the state trespass law construed by the state court.
The trend toward non-abstention in civil rights has continued
in an unbroken pattern in the most recent cases. In Donovan v.
Dallas,43 the Supreme Court reversed a contempt citation issued
by an intermediate Texas court. The citation was the result of an
attorney's refusal to comply with a writ of prohibition barring
him from enjoining the Dallas airport expansion program. Al-
though the writ was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court, the
attorney disregarded it by appealing from the federal district
court's dismissal of his bill for injunction. The Court refused to
apply abstention because the plaintiff had a federal right to prose-
cute his claim in a federal court. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by
Mr. Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that
multiple litigation justified permitting state court control over the
litigation.
39. Id. at 375.
40. 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
41. 374 U.S. 802 (1963).
42. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
43. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
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In Dombrowski v. Pfister,44 the Supreme Court reversed a
district court dismissal of a complaint brought under the Civil
Rights Act.45 The complaint sought a declaratory judgment and
injunction to restrain Louisiana officials from prosecuting for vio-
lations of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Con-
trol Law. 46 In delivering the Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan
said abstention was inappropriate because there was no immediate
prospect of final state adjudication which would satisfactorily re-
solve all constitutional issues. Abstention would have permitted
Louisiana to continue harassing the plaintiffs by invoking the stat-
ute in bad faith. Mr. Justice Brennan thought such potential state
action created special circumstances requiring federal determina-
tion rather than abstention. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr.
Justice Clark, dissented characterizing the refusal to abstain as
the abolition of the doctrine in all such suits:
As one who considers that it is a prime responsibility of
this Court to maintain federal-state court relationships in
good working order, I cannot subscribe to a holding which
displays such insensitivity to the legitimate demands of
those relationships under our federal system. I see no such
incompatibility between the abstention doctrine and the
full vindication of constitutionally protected rights as the
Court finds to exist in cases of this kind.
4 '
Mr. Justice Harlan believed the majority view would prevent the
state from resolving federal constitutional claims in state pro-
ceedings, and that it unfairly assumed the Louisiana Supreme
Court would not be as prompt or effective as a federal tribunal
in protecting the appellants' constitutional rights.
More recently, construing the twenty-fourth amendment in
Harman v. Forssenius,48 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a Virginia statute requiring residents to either pay poll taxes or
file residence certificates to vote in federal elections. The Court
affirmed a district court refusal to stay proceedings and held the
statute unconstitutional. On behalf of a unanimous Court, the
Chief Justice formulated a restricted basis upon which it would
abstain:
If the state statute in question, although never interpreted
by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpre-
tation which will render unnecessary or substantially
modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of
44. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
46. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 374, 390-90.8 (Supp. 1962).
47. 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965).
48. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
the federal court to exercise its properly invoked juris-
diction.
49
In concurring, Mr. Justice Harlan agreed this was not a suitable
case for applying the abstention doctrine.
The "special circumstance" justification for non-abstention
appeared again in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 0 The Court
reviewed a partly statutory and partly administrative plan of New
York state designed to prevent the appointment or retention of
subversive persons in state employment. On behalf of the Court,
Mr. Justice Brennan found that abstention was not justified even
though neither the statute nor the administrative regulations had
been litigated in state courts. Mr. Justice Brennan placed great
emphasis upon the intricate administrative machinery which ren-
dered the plan a fearful mechanism and constituted the special
circumstances needed to justify non-abstention. It is significant
that the dissenters, Mr. Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White,
based their disagreement on substantive grounds rather than upon
the abstention concept.
In Thorpe v. Housing Authority"1 a tenant in a federally
assisted housing project was given notice of cancellation of her
lease without reasons one day after her election as president of
the tenants association. An eviction judgment was affirmed by the
state supreme court despite the tenant's contention that it was in
violation of her constitutionally protected rights of association and
notice of reasons for the eviction. Following the grant of certiorari
by the Supreme Court a federal administrative directive was
issued requiring local housing authorities to give reasons for
eviction and to afford opportunity for reply. The Supreme Court
vacated the state court judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with the directive. In concurring,
Mr. Justice Douglas would have applied abstention to determine
the precise reason why she was evicted and whether the reason
was within the permissible range of state action against the indi-
vidual. Mr. Justice White dissented on the substantive ground
that the petitioner had been afforded a full due process hearing.
In Zwickler v. Koota,5 2 the Court followed the reasoning of
the NAACP v. Bennett s in which abstention was held to be
inappropriate if there were no possibility of the state courts con-
struing the statute to avoid or modify the constitutional question.
Speaking for the entire Court, Mr. Justice Brennan ordered the
district court to rule upon the appellant's contention that a New
York statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills 54
49. Id. at 534, 535.
50. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
51. 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
52. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
53. 360 U.S. 471 (1959); see text accompanying note 18 supra.
54. N.Y. EDUCATIONAL LAW § 457 (McKinney 1965).
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in a political campaign violated constitutional guarantees of free
speech and expression. The "special circumstance" doctrine of
the Dombrowski case was applicable here. As a consequence, the
federal judiciary had a responsibility equal to that of the state
court to adjudicate the constitutional claim. In a concurring opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Harlan reiterated his plea to dispose of abstentiorn
issues on a case-by-case basis rather than by a declared formula.
The type of analysis favored by Mr. Justice Harlan led the
Court in Cameron v. Johnson" to find that no "special circum-
stances" existed to justify non-abstention. Appellants appealed
from a district court dismissal of their petition for declaratory judg-
ment that the Mississippi Anti-Picketing Law56 was overly broad
and an unconstitutionally vague regulation of speech and expres-
sion. After examining the circumstances, Mr. Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the Court found no "special circumstance" justifying
the assumption of jurisdiction. Mr. Justices Fortas and Douglas
disssented on the grounds that the circumstances indicated state
action designed to discourage the assertion of appellants' constitu-
tional rights. The dissenting Justices believed "special circum-
stances" were amply present.
In Zwicker v. Boll,57 the Court dismissed a complaint brought
by politically active university students who contended that the
Wisconsin Disorderly Conduct Act5 was unconstitutional and that
their prosecution under it was in reprisal for their activity. Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that the appellants had
established the "special circumstances" necessary for non-absten-
tion. He believed their prosecution was conducted in a discrimi-
natory manner and in bad faith to discourage the exercise of their
constitutional rights.
The Court has abandoned the abstention principle in the civil
rights cases when construing state statutes and administrative
determinations where the record is fully developed and the issues
are concrete and ripe for review. Such factors as federal-state
harmony, prior state court determination, and avoidance of de-
cisions which might prove to be advisory were utilized to justify
abstention in the earlier cases. More recent cases are premised
upon the assumption that Supreme Court judgment on civil rights,
which is entitled to preferential protection under the Constitution,
is a final judgment on the merits. "Special circumstances," de-
55. 88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968).
56. Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 2A, § 2318.5 (Supp. 1968).
57. 88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968).
58. WIs. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 947.01 (1958).
liberate state violations of constitutional rights, and the duty to
adjudicate diversity of citizenship cases have been used to justify
non-abstention.
PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION
The bulk of cases before the Supreme Court involving ab-
stention have been concerned with such diverse matters as public
utility regulation, commerce, taxation, land use, creditors' rights,
contractual relations and other miscellaneous subjects. While the
Court applied the Pullman rationale initially in utility regulation,
it soon became apparent that other policy considerations were suf-
ficiently potent to provide justifications for by-passing its appli-
cation.
In Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co., 59 a West
Virginia corporation, alleging an unconstitutional attempt to regu-
late interstate commerce, sought to enjoin the Ohio Public Utilities
Commission from requiring proof that the rates to an Ohio utility
were just and reasonable. In the interim, Congress enacted the
Natural Gas Act of 1938.60 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Court, found that a combination of factors, including length of
litigation, public interest and the unlikelihood of state rulings
settling the issue required federal disposal. The majority con-
cluded that the federal statute had pre-empted prospective regu-
lation and that the commission was not empowered to fix rates
retroactively. Mr. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented
on the grounds that the state court should have been afforded an
opportunity to make an independent determination and that the
failure to do so reduced the Court's interpretation to a mere fore-
cast.
Conflict between abstention and federal jurisdiction in diver-
sity of citizenship 6' cases arose shortly after the abstention doc-
trine was formulated. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,6 2 the Texas Rail-
road Commission had developed comprehensive administrative
rules for allocating drill permits. Contrary to the rules, Burford
was granted a permit for minimum spacing between wells. The
Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the district court to grant
Sun Oil Company's petition to enjoin the state administrative order.
Mr. Justice Black found that federal judicial involvement in inter-
preting state oil and gas statutes and in ruling on state conserva-
tion policy created such delays and serious consequences that the
Court was justified in abstaining pending state determination of
the issue. Mr. Justices Douglas and Murphy concurred because
federal determination meant an active participation in fashion-
59. 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
60. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1964).
61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
62. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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ing state policy, interference in state affairs, divided authority
and friction between sovereigns. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, nor-
mally a strong supporter of abstention, dissented because while
Congress had repeatedly refused to narrow the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts, the majority was
achieving this goal by simply abstaining. He thought the Court
by abstaining had acted in direct opposition to the Constitution
and congressional policy on the mistaken premise that the federal
courts would be unfair to state-oriented interests.
63
Delimitation of abstention, begun in United Fuel Gas, con-
tinued in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC.64 The
utility unsuccessfully applied to the Federal Power Commission
under the Federal Power Act 5 for a license to construct a dam but
could not show compliance with Iowa's statute which forbade the
diversion of waters in the construction of dams. The FPC refused
the license because of its determination that the federal statute did
not supersede the state act. The Supreme Court ruled the federal
statute pre-empted the field although the state retained collateral
jurisdiction over riparian rights and river banks. Dissenting, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter would have applied abstention to have the
conflict between both statutes resolved by a state court ruling.
The consequence of split litigation in federal and state courts
became a major problem for the Court in Alabama Public Service
Commission v. Southern Ry.66 After the state commission denied
the carrier's petition to discontinue specific intra-state passenger
service, the carrier, without complying with state appeals proce-
dures, filed a complaint in the federal district court which enjoined
the commission. Speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson decided federal courts were not required to
exercise jurisdiction in cases involving both diversity of citizenship
and constitutional issues. Relying on Burford and Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock v. Huffman,6 7 the Court held that federal juris-
diction should not be exercised. The state commission and state
court, acting on predominantly local factors, could afford a compre-
hensive review which would not require federal intervention to
protect constitutional rights. Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson opposed the basis of the
Court's refusal to entertain suit. The dissenters said:
63. Id. at 345.
64. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
65. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 802, 821 (1964).
66. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
67. 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
The only reason for declining to entertain the suit is that
it may well be more desirable as a matter of State-Fed-
eral relations for the order of a State agency to be re-
viewed originally in the State lower court and not to be
challenged in the first instance in a federal court. It is
not for me to quarrel with the wisdom of such a policy.
But Congress, in the constitutional exercise of its power
to define the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts,
has decided otherwise.6 8
The federal government and the State of California confronted
in Public Utilities Commission v. United States." The state stat-
ute70 permitted common carriers to transport governmental prop-
erty at reduced rates approved and deemed just and reasonable by
the commission. The United States filed suit in a three judge dis-
trict court7 ' requesting the statute be declared unconstitutional
and the commission be enjoined from enforcing it. In issue was the
control over a great volume of military traffic between points in
California since the United States had negotiated rates for ship-
ping property of government personnel at rates equal to or lower
than those for regular commercial shipments. Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the Court's opinion invalidating the state statute. He
rejected abstention and emphasized that the state statute violated
the supremacy clause of the federal constitution by conflicting
with congressional procurement policy. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Burton, dissented.
They would have applied abstention on the grounds that no con-
stitutional conclusions should have been reached before giving Cali-
fornia an opportunity to interpret and implement its own statute.
The Court has not applied the abstention principle consistently
in disposing of public utility regulation cases. The doctrine has
been justified by congressional policy and as a means to avoid
delays and intrusions upon state programs. Where the Court has
rejected the rule, its conclusions have been justified by the exer-
cise of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the existence of constitu-
tional issues and the federal pre-emption of state activity.
REGULATION OF COMMERCE
From a classic application of the abstention doctrine in the
regulation of commerce by state and local government, the Court
has evolved a series of principles which permit it to assume juris-
diction and dispose of issues raised on their merits. The Supreme
Court was unanimous in applying the abstention doctrine in Chicago
v. Fieldcrest Dairies7 2 where litigation was simultaneously con-
68. 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951).
69. 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
70. CAL. Pus. UTIL. CODE § 530 (West 1955).
71. Injunctions; Three Judge Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
72. 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
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ducted in federal and state courts. In the federal district court a
Michigan dairy corporation, alleging unconstitutionality, success-
fully enjoined the enforcement of a 1935 Chicago ordinance re-
quiring milk sold in less than single gallon quantities to be de-
livered in standard milk bottles. While the matter was pending
in the federal courts, the parent dairy company obtained a state
court injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance. State
jurisdiction was retained pending an appeal from the federal dis-
trict court injunction. The Supreme Court applied the Pullman
principle observing that the constitutional issue might be avoided
by state resolution of the litigation. The Court also considered
the value of harmonious relationship between federal and state
authorities.
The doctrine was expanded to apply to state administrative
determinations in the area of interstate commerce in Shipman v.
Du Pre.7" Appellants alleged portions of the South Carolina
shrimping and fishing statute were unconstitutional. The Court
abstained from construing the statute because the issue had not
been reviewed by the state courts.
The abstention issue was argued along procedural lines in
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.14 The petitioner sought
a federal declaratory injunction against the commission ruling
that a shipment between two points within the state was in inter-
state commerce although no evidence of past, present or future
state administrative prosecution was offered. The Court review-
ing on the technical issue of whether a single federal district
court judge could hear the action,75 dismissed the complaint be-
cause no concrete adverse relationships existed between the
parties. Mr. Justice Jackson believed that the declaratory judg-
ment proceeding would not only foreclose compatible federal-
state relations but would also prejudice the issue which should be
initially determined by state administrative and judicial agencies.
Concurring, Mr. Justice Reed observed that since application of
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 19346 was a matter of
discretion for the federal courts and since the company faced no
unusual loss or danger, the state court should resolve the contro-
versy. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas found no justification for
abstaining since no congressional policy existed in favor of having
federal statutory rights protected in state rather than in federal
courts.
73, 339 U.S. 321 (1950).
74. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
75. Injunctions; Three Judge Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
76. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
In Chicago v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry.,77 the railroads in
Chicago agreed to use the Railroad Transfer Service facilities to
transport passengers within the city. Chicago amended its licen-
sing ordinance requiring RTS to obtain a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the city commissioner of licenses who possessed
absolute discretion on the issuance of new licenses. The RTS re-
fused to apply for the certificate because it engaged in interstate
commerce and petitioned the federal district court for a declaratory
judgment that the act was inapplicable to it or was invalid under
the commerce clause of the Constitution. Delivering the Court's
opinion, Mr. Justice Black found abstention was not warranted on
the estoppel theory that the city had made no move in the federal
courts to have the case remitted to the state tribunal. The ab-
sence of any ambiguity in the statute and the substantial delay
and expense in remitting the case justified federal disposal of the
issue. This viewpoint was attacked by Mr. Justices Harlan, Frank-
furter and Burton. They characterized the majority decision as a
disregarding of the legitimate interests of the city and a pre-
mature interference in local administration. They preferred to
remand the issue to the district court with proceedings stayed
pending RTS application for a license.
The Court continued its refusal to abstain in construing the
relationship between the twenty-first amendment and the com-
merce clause in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.
78
The corporation, which was unable to obtain a state liquor license,
sold liquor to departing international airline passengers for de-
livery on arrival at foreign destination. When the state liquor
authority claimed the business violated state law, the corporation
successfully sought a federal district court injunction against prose-
cution. The Supreme Court affirmed. Speaking for the Court,
Mr. Justice Stewart held that New York might not impede the con-
gressional exercise of power over foreign commerce. He refused
to abstain since there was no danger that a federal decision would
work a disruption of the state scheme for regulating the sale and
consumption of liquor.
Where the Court has recently refused to apply abstention in
the field of regulation, its conclusion has been justified by the
need for a uniform national policy, the supremacy of federal over
state power, an estoppel theory, and the absence of any disruption
of state legislative schemes resulting from the exercise of fed-
eral judicial decision-making.
TAXATION
The established pattern of applying the abstention doctrine to
taxation issues and the subsequent exceptions parallels the develop-
77. 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
78. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
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ment in other areas. In Great Lake Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huff-
man,7 1 the Court unanimously affirmed the validity of the state ad-
ministrative enforcement of the Louisiana unemployment compen-
sation statute. Without specifically referring to abstention, the
Court reiterated the principle that federal judges exercising equi-
table discretion would ordinarily not restrain state officials where
state remedies were adequate since such refusal avoided needless
obstruction of state policy.
The same conclusion was reached in Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. McLaughlin0 where the uncertainty of state interpretation
of its own statute was the rationalization justifying abstention,
although the motivating force behind the decision was the canon
of avoiding needless constitutional construction. The petitioner,
seeking a federal injunction, contended the Connecticut State Cor-
poration Business Tax Act of 19351 was unconstitutional in vio-
lation of the commerce clause and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The major reason underlying the Court's
direction that the lower court retain jurisdiction pending state de-
termination of the statute was stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any
other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that
we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality-
here the distribution of the taxing power as between the
State and the Nation-unless such adjudication is unavoid-
able. And so, as questions of federal constitutional power
have become more and more intertwined with preliminary
doubts about local law, we have insisted that federal courts
do not decide questions of constitutionality on the basis of
preliminary guesses regarding local law.1
2
An exception to this general proposition was developed in Hills-
borough Township v. Cromwell.3 Mr. Justice Douglas found that
such factors as the existing confusion over the applicable state
law, the limited state protection afforded to the taxpayer and the
uncertainty of remedies all justified refusal to abstain. The issue
involved a taxpayer's suit under the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act 4 to set aside an assessment of intangible personalty on
constitutional grounds of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
In several subsequent cases the Court avoided the inconsist-
79. 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
80. 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 213-42 (1961).
82. 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
83. 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
84. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
encies of its application of the abstention rule by silent refusal to
apply it. In Toomer v. Witsell"5 the federal district court denied
injunctive relief against an allegedly unconstitutional South Caro-
lina statute regulating commercial shrimping within the three
mile coastal waters and requiring non-residents to pay a fee one
hundred times more than residents. A unanimous Court did not
abstain on the theory that, since individual appellants could not
pay a tax under protest and later recover, they would suffer
irreparable damage under an unambiguous statute. The Court
rested its decision upon the constitutional ground that the statute
violated the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. There was no reasonable relationship between the
non-residential status and the discrimination suffered.
In the field of federal estate taxation the Court refused to ab-
stain in Commissioner v. Estate of Church6 and Estate of Spiegel
v. Commissioner.7  The state supreme court had not determined
whether a possibility of reverter existed. The Court for tax pur-
poses included the contingency interest in the decedent's gross
estate. In Church Estate, the Court avoided the abstention doc-
trine and engaged in reconciling case law. In his dissent Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter advocated abstention to avoid the possibility that a
subsequent state court ruling would reverse the Court's interpre-
tation. In Spiegel Estate, Mr. Justice Black, delivering the Court's
opinion expressly relied upon Meredith v. Winterhavens in up-
holding the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Service. Mr.
Justice Burton dissented on the grounds that no possibility of re-
verter existed under state law.
Where the doctrine has been utilized in the tax field, the signifi-
cant factors have been the avoidance of federal action which would
obstruct state policies and the doctrine of avoiding constitutional
construction. The refusal to abstain has been justified by judicial
evaluation of the inadequacy of state remedies and the confusion
over state policies. In some tax cases the body of abstention case
law has been ignored without comment.
LAND USE
Land use issues involving abstention have been concerned with
the invasion of private property rights or the rights of the federal
government as owner of interests in land. In General Box Co. v.
United States8 9 the Court was asked to determine whether the
United States could, with state permission, claim the right to
destroy trees in a river area without compensation where the
85. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
86, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
87. 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
88. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
89. 351 U.S. 159 (1956).
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Louisiana Constitution o obligated the state to maintain river
levees. After the federal district court had awarded damages to
the owners for the value of the timber the Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals reversal because the state's power to act
without liability passed to the United States. Mr. Justice Frank-
further would have applied abstention to permit a state deter-
mination which would have avoided Court speculation. Mr. Jus-
tices Douglas and Harlan, dissented on the grounds that the Court
should have deferred to the lower court on questions of local law.
They noted that the district court judge had been an experienced
state judge, a member of the state constitutional body which had
framed the clause in controversy and an expert whose judgment
should have been respected.
It was conflict between the federal and state government which
motivated the court to apply abstention in Leiter Minerals Inc. v.
United States.91 Plaintiff Leiter, claiming title to mineral rights
under land owned by the United States, sued the lessees of the
publicly owned land in a state court. The state court ruled against
the lessees' contention that suit could not proceed without joining
the federal government. The United States then sought a federal
injunction to enjoin the state Court. Leiter moved to have the
federal court proceedings dismissed or stayed pending state court
determination of the issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals that the federal government could
protect its legal position defensively in a federal court proceeding
and modified the lower court ruling by requiring that federal pro-
ceedings await state court interpretation of the state statute. The
Court reached its conclusion relying upon the Pullman, Spector,
and Stainback cases. While Mr. Justice Douglas concurred that
the state court action was properly enjoined, he dissented on the
application of the abstention doctrine believing that federal title
questions had been entrusted to the federal courts by Congress.
In state eminent domain cases involving due process and prop-
erty expropriation issues, the Court has been faced with the alter-
native of approving the stay of federal proceedings while abstaining
or recognizing the responsibility for federal judicial decision-mak-
ing without any intervening state review. The self-limiting ele-
ments in the doctrine of judicial review and the prominence of
state policy issues have resulted in the continued application of
abstention to a greater degree than in other areas.
90. LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (1955).
91. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
The doctrine was applied in Meridian v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 92 where the company alleged a 1956 Mississippi statute
was unconstitutional. The statute imposed a charge on public
utilities for the use of streets. In a per curiam opinion the Court
ruled that the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction required that
controversies about unsettled questions of state law be resolved in
state courts prior to federal consideration of the underlying con-
stitutional issue. The state decision might obviate the need for an
unnecessary constitutional review.
A comprehensive exposition of the policy reasons for abstain-
ing was written in Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux.
9 3
The city filed a petition in the state court to expropriate the
property of a Florida corporation. The corporation removed the
case to the federal district court on the grounds of diversity of
citizenship. The district court stayed federal proceedings until the
Supreme Court of Louisiana interpreted the state statute, and the
court of appeals reversed because no exceptional circumstances
existed. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, reinstated the district court stay of proceedings so the
parties could obtain an authoritative state ruling. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter defended abstention saying it was unworthy of the
federal judiciary to think it was attempting to shirk responsibility.
He spoke of the special nature of eminent domain proceedings, the
respective competence of state and federal court systems, and the
value of promoting harmonious federal-state relations by the use
of abstention. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Douglas, now emerging as the principal critics of
abstention, dissented because the two prerequisites for the appli-
cation of the doctrine were absent, viz., avoiding the decision of pre-
mature or unnecessary constitutional questions and the hazard of
unsettling the delicate balance of federal-state relations. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan said there was no friction between sovereigns since
federal courts were constantly administering state law as precisely
as state courts. In contrast to Meredith v. Winterhaven,9 4 Mr.
Justice Brennan found abstention served the court's convenience
since it avoided difficult questions of state law. He identified the
majority's espousal of abstention with its distaste for diversity of
jurisdiction cases: "Until Congress speaks otherwise, the federal
judiciary has no choice but conscientiously to render justice for
litigants from different states."95  Mr. Justice Brennan charged
that the decision encouraged inefficiency, inordinate delays, waste
and added expense.
The conflict among the Justices over the application of the
92. 358 U.S. 639 (1959).
93. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
94. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
95. 360 U.S. 25, 41 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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abstention doctrine continued in Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda CoY
where a sharply divided Court refused to apply abstention. A
Pennsylvania county instituted eminent domain proceedings to
appropriate the property of a Wisconsin citizen. While a valuation
suit was pending in the state court, the county leased a portion of
the property to another private party. The owner of the expro-
priated property sued in the federal district court alleging the
taking was unconstitutional since it was made for a private pur-
pose. The District court dismissed the action and the court of
appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. Mr.
Justice Brennan took the opportunity to recast the abstention
principle in a new and restricted form as an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of the federal courts to adjudicate
cases properly before it. He said the abdication could be justified
"only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the
parties to repair the state court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest. '9 7 Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Harlan, argued that the exceptional circum-
stances justifying abstention were factually present. Mr. Justice
Douglas continued to press his belief that the existence of a con-
crete constitutional issue required federal disposal of issues which
could be sidetracked by applying abstention.
Mr. Justice Douglas's belief was demonstrated in Martin v.
Creary.98 The Pennsylvania Limited Access Highways Act 0 pro-
vided that owners of land abutting a limited access highway were
entitled to damages resulting from the actual taking of property
but not consequential damages where no property was taken. Re-
spondents owned property abutting a highway about to be desig-
nated limited access under authority of the statute. They sued in a
federal district court for injunctive relief and a judgment declar-
ing the act unconstitutional. The three judge district court 00
stayed proceedings to permit state court interpretation of the
rights accruing to the parties. The state supreme court without
interpreting the rights said merely that landowners' rights would
be protected. Concluding that the state did not intend to compen-
sate the abutting landowners, the district court enjoined enforce-
ment of the act. The federal district court adjudicated the con-
troversy on the grounds the plaintiff would be irreparably dam-
96. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
97. Id. at 188, 189.
98. 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2391 (1961).
100. Injunctions, Three Judge Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2284 (1964).
aged while their rights were being determined. Delivering the
Supreme Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart reversed the district
court and applied abstention after finding the three essential re-
quirements: (1) avoidance of unnecessary constitutional ruling, (2)
avoidance of federal state conflict, and (3) unnecessary impairment
of a vital state function. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part.
He agreed the lower federal court improperly enjoined the state
program. He found, however, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
a federal declaratory judgment as to whether access to a highway
was a property right under the fourteenth amendment.
Most recently, the Court unanimously applied abstention and
ordered the district court to retain jurisdiction until the New Mexico
courts determined the meaning of the term "public use." The plain-
tiff in a diversity of citizenship suit alleged that a New Mexico
statute permitting a trespass upon his property in order to exer-
cise state granted water rights was a violation of the state constitu-
tion. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co."' the Court based
its absention on the grounds that sound judicial administration
required that the parties have the benefit of the same rule of law
as applied to others in the state. Although Mr. Justice Brennan
joined by Mr. Justices Douglas and Marshall concurred, their agree-
ment was based upon the belief that special circumstances justified
the use of abstention.
In appropriation cases, while the doctrine continues to be
applied, the later cases have seen both a restatement of principle
in stricter terms and an unwillingness to interfere with the role of
the state courts in making an original and primary impression upon
the applicable state law.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
The Court has been asked to apply abstention in cases in-
volving the rights of creditors in the refunding of bond issues,
bankruptcy and enemy alien property rights where there was con-
flict between state and federal policy.
In its earliest consideration, Meredith v. Winterhaven,102 the
plaintiffs, suing in a federal district court on a diversity of citizen-
ship theory, sought an injunction to prevent the city from calling in
bonds without prior payment of the stipulated interest. The dis-
trict court decided the case on the merits. The court of appeals
reversed and dismissed without prejudice in order to have the
issue of unsettled state law determined in the state courts. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Mr. Chief Justice
Stone delivering the Supreme Court's opinion said:
[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
101. 88 S. Ct. 1753 (1968).
102. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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hereafter determine the state law to be do not in them-
selves afford a sufficient ground to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to
it for decision.
10 3
At this early stage in the development of the abstention doctrine,
the Chief Justice realized that permitting abstention would only
further delay the final disposition of the issue. Mr. Justices Black
and Jackson dissented in reliance upon the lower court decision
favoring abstention.
Uncertainty of state law, used for justification for refusal to
abstain in the Winterhaven case, was used to reach the opposite
conclusion in Huddleston v. Dwyer.10 4 Holders of defaulted mu-
nicipal bonds secured by assessments on city property sought a
mandamus in the federal district court to compel a tax levy to
pay the overdue assessments. The Supreme Court applied ab-
stention because the latest Oklahoma Supreme Court decision 10
created an uncertainty as to the applicable state law. The exper-
tise of state judges learned in the intricacies of local law, the
speculative character of a federal ruling and the orderly judicial
administration of justice provided justification for this judicial
conclusion.
The delimitation of the doctrine was continued in Williams v.
Green Bay & W.R.R. 06 New York resident bond holders sued in
the state court to recover payment on their investment and the
carrier unsuccessfully attempted to transfer the case to the federal
district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Reversing
the lower court, the Supreme Court observed that the problem of
ascertaining the state law was not itself a sufficient reason for a
federal court to decline jurisdiction. Circumscription of the doctrine
was accomplished by the Court's statement that each case turns
upon its particular facts.
A similar result was reached in Callaway v. Benton'0 7 where
the Court refused to abstain in favor of prior state court deter-
mination. The Court ruled that bankruptcy proceedings'0 8 in
federal district courts were limited by state reorganization statutes
as applied to non-creditor lessors whose rights were affected by
federal reorganization processes. Mr. Justices Douglas and Rutledge
dissented, reasoning that the majority ruling frustrated congres-
103. Id. at 234.
104. 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
105. Wilson v. Hollis, 193 Okl. 241, 142 P.2d 633 (1943).
106. 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
107. 336 U.S. 132 (1949).
108. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1965).
sional policy since it meant federal control over reorganization
practices would now be shared with state courts.
When the Court has reviewed cases involving the conflict be-
tween the powers of the Federal Alien Property Custodian and
state inheritance and receiver statutes, it has consistently refused
to permit prior state court determinations of the relationship be-
tween federal and state statutes. In Markham v. Allen,10 the
Alien Property Custodian issued an order under the Trading with
the Enemy Act 10 vesting title to property in himself. He filed
suit in a federal district court seeking a judgment that six Cali-
fornia resident claimants had no interest in the property. Mr.
Chief Justice Stone, delivering the Court's opinion, refused to find
that the district court's assumption of jurisdiction under the Win-
terhaven precedent was an error. The statute"' conferred the
power to enter such orders as were necessary and proper to en-
force the federal statute. The effect of the decision was to leave
ultimate disposition over the property with the state court. Mr.
Justice Rutledge preferred to apply abstention to permit the state
court to determine the persons eligible to share in the net estate.
In a second enemy alien property case, Propper v. Clark,"'
the Court resolved the claim of title to enemy assets in favor of
the Alien Property Custodian against a New York State court-
appointed receiver. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed,
refused to abstain to permit the state court to make the initial
determination of the non-constitutional issue. Refusal was
grounded upon the Winterhaven rule' and upon Erie HR. v.
Tompkins." 4 Supporting this conclusion was the need for a uni-
fied national policy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, citing Pull-
man, Fieldcrest, Spector, Watson, and United Fuel Gas. A regard
for the respective role of federal and state tribunals meant that a
definitive state court adjudication was preferable to a federal
court's tentative interpretation of a state statute.
There is conflicting precedent over the applicability of absten-
tion in bond issue cases. Assuming the absence of a constitutional
issue and the presence of intricate local laws, the Court favors
abstention. Non-abstention is the guiding principle in bankruptcy
and alien property cases. The need for unified national policy is a
material factor in the Court's decision to assume jurisdiction and
decide federal and state issues in alien property cases.
109. 326 U.S. 490 (1945).
110. Trading with the Enemy Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 5, 40 Stat.
415, as amended Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 839. (Now Trading
with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 5 (1968).
111. Id.
112. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
113. Id. at 490.
114. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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MISCELLANEOUS
During the twenty-five years of the development of the absten-
tion doctrine, the Supreme Court has also considered a miscellany
of subjects including price-fixing, insurance contracts, marital
rights, wrongful death, and family responsibility.
Case development displays the pattern which has been re-
peatedly presented-application of abstention followed by subse-
quent exception and delimitation. In Watson v. Buck,115 the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers sought
to enjoin the enforcement of a Florida criminal statute prohibiting
musical copyright holders from combining to fix fees and practices.
The Court unanimously applied the abstention doctrine because
the highest state court had not previously construed the issue and
the federal judiciary should not enjoin state criminal proceedings
except in cases of extraordinary injury or irreparable damage.
The abstention issue is sometimes imbedded within a narrower
question resulting in judicial disposal of both issues without com-
ment on abstention. This circumstance has determined the re-
sult in two insurance cases. In Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co." 6 plaintiffs commenced suit in a state court to re-
cover under a life insurance policy. The defendant-insurance car-
rier transferred to the federal district court, filed a counterclaim of
fraud and asked the contract be voided. The plaintiff's request
for dismissal of the counterclaim was certified to the Supreme
Court. Mr. Justice Roberts, delivering the Court's opinion, rejected
the contention that the local law of the state governed the issue
and ruled that the federal courts were not bound to cancel the con-
tract simply because the insurer could obtain cancellation under
state law. Without discussing the merits of abstention, the Court
rejected the application of the principle.
In a second insurance case, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office
Ltd.,117 the Court applied the abstention doctrine. The claimant,
an Illinois resident, purchased a personal property "floater" policy
from an Illinois and Florida licensed carrier and later moved to
Florida. He sued in a federal district court in Florida to recover a
loss claim under the policy. The Court reversed and remanded the
proceedings because a Florida statute118 permitted the federal
court to certify a doubtful question of state law to the Florida
115. 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
116. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
117. 368 U.S. 207 (1960).
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.03 (1957).
Supreme Court for determination. The Court thought it was
appropriate to obtain an authoritative state court determination of
an unresolved question of local law which might render the fed-
eral constitutional question moot. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented. They
found no local or vague issue involved and thought the appli-
cation of abstention by the majority had been carried to "a wholly
injustifiable extreme." They wrote, "there are times when a con-
stitutional question is so important that it should be decided even
though judicial ingenuity would find a way to escape it. I would
decide this case here and now."119 The dissenters, believing fed-
eral-state harmony could best be achieved by deciding the con-
stitutional issue, noted that the Florida Supreme Court had never
accepted a certificate from a federal court to decide a difficult
question. Dissenting separately, Mr. Justice Douglas believed
that the only explanation for the majority's refusal to decide the
controversy was its hostility to diversity of citizenship cases.
Diversity of citizenship has offered an opportunity for the
Court to state its views in the field of marital rights. In Sutton
v. Leib, 20 the petitioner, divorced in Illinois and awarded alimony
until remarriage, subsequently remarried in Nevada. The New
York courts annulled her marriage because her second husband
was already married in New York, voiding his attempted Nevada
marriage. After the court of appeals affirmed the district court
judgment that the Nevada marriage was valid, the Supreme Court
reversed. Mr. Justice Reed, delivering the Court's opinion, ruled
the Illinois alimony issue was a question which could not be suit-
ably divided between federal and state courts. Although Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment, he preferred to have
the question resolved by the Illinois courts. An opposite result
was reached in Aldrich v. Aldrich,121 a diversity of citizenship
suit involving an alimony issue. The Court certified the legal ques-
tion involved to the Florida Supreme Court under Rule 4.61 of the
Florida Appellate Rules since there was no clear state precedent.
Interpretation of a state wrongful death statute became en-
meshed with the abstention principle in The Tungus v. Skov-
gaard.1"1 Skovgaard's widow filed an admiralty action in the
federal district court alleging The Tungus unseaworthy and negli-
gent toward her decedent-husband. The court of appeals reversing
the district court dismissal decided negligence was established and
the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act 123 covered the claim of un-
seaworthiness. The Supreme Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the Court, admitted that the state court had not
119. 363 U.S. 207, 214.
120. 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
121. 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
122. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
123. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 31-1 (1952).
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ruled on the issue, that a federal judgment was no better than a
prediction and that the matter should normally be referred to the
state court under the Pullman doctrine. He relied on Spiegel,
however, and refused to disturb the judgment of the court of
appeals. Relying on Sutton, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred
and would have abstained to obtain an authoritative state court
ruling. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justices Black and Douglas, concurred and dissented in
part. While concurring in the result, they dissented in the belief
that the decedent was entitled to recover as a result of breach of a
federally defined duty of seaworthiness which looked only to the
state law of remedies for protection. Mr. Justice Brennan advo-
cated federal adjudication rather than abstention. The dissenters
further believed referral to the state would result in various state
interpretations which would be inconsistent with the national pol-
icy of the federal statute.
In a recent wrongful death case, the Court refused to abstain
where the federal and state issues were related and the defendant
had not raised the absence of a state ruling as justification for
federal abstention. In Provident Tradesman Bank and Trust Co. v.
Patterson,124 a unanimous Court upheld the federal district court
verdict which had interpreted the Pennsylvania "dead man's rule"
as excluding the defendant's testimony against the decedent and
permitting his testimony against live plaintiffs. The interpretation
had not been resolved by the state court. While the Court enun-
ciated the general abstention principle, it justified its refusal to
abstain because
this being a discretionary matter, the existence of a verdict
reached after a prolonged trial in which the defendants
did not invoke the pending state actions should be taken
into consideration in deciding whether abstention is the
wiser course.
125
The Court applied abstention in Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirchner126 where the plaintiff sought to set aside a
state court judgment for her parent's maintenance in a state in-
stitution. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Unable to determine whether the Court had jurisdiction, he
ordered the state court judgment vacated with leave to file a new
petition if the state court subsequently held its judgment did not
rest on an independent non-federal ground. Mr. Justice Douglas
would have dismissed the federal proceeding entirely.
124. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
125. Id. at 126.
126. 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
CONCLUSION
The abstention principle provides a mechanism for permitting
the Court to carry out its decisional role in the areas of constitu-
tional development and diversity of citizenship while reconciling
the competing interests of federal and state governments. Simul-
taneously the doctrine satisfies the policy of avoiding constitutional
issues except where it is necessary to decide them. Lightening of
the Court's workload does not appear to be a significant reason for
the application of the doctrine. On the contrary, its application
introduces an intermediate step in the Court's decisional burdens as
well as an increased workload for lower federal courts.
127
Why, then, did the Court have to develop the doctrine? The
answer lies in the composite reasons given in the support of the
adoption of the abstention rule:
Avoiding speculative or advisory federal rulings,
Avoiding friction in federal-state relations,
Avoiding the impairment of state policies or programs,
Expertise of state judges,
Uncertainty of state court rulings,
Avoiding premature and unnecessary decision of federal
constitutional issues,
Peculiarity of local problems,
Collateral jurisdiction over state subjects,
Assumption that state courts will protect federal con-
stitutional rights,
Protection against ousting or limiting federal jurisdiction,
Exercise of judicial equitable discretion,
Self-limitations in exercising federal judicial power ulti-
mately increases its total power,
Judicial precedent.
The two underlying principles which emerge from an analysis
of these reasons are the judicial self-limitation inherent in the
doctrine of judicial supremacy and the conception of federalism.
127. This conclusion is supported by the evidence that in 38.70% of the
cases involving abstention, the cases were returned to lower federal or state
supreme courts for further judicial processing.
Table 4
Supreme Court Action on Lower Court Decisions
in Abstention Cases
Number of Cases Affirmed 19
Percentage of Cases Affirmed 30.65
Number of Cases Reversed 19
Percentage of Cases Reversed 30.65
Number of Cases Reversed and
Returned to Lower Federal Court 17
Percentage of Cases Reversed and
Returned to Lower Federal Court 27.41
Number of Cases Reversed and
Returned to State Supreme Courts 7
Percentage of Cases Reversed and
Returned to State Supreme Courts 11.29
Total Number of Abstention Cases 62
Total Percentage of Abstention
Cases 100.00
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The extent to which the Court's distaste for reviewing diversity of
citizenship cases formed the basis of its decision to abstain, has
not been fully analyzed in its own opinions although occasional
references to such unwillingness appear over the years. The
Court's initial conception of federalism was one in which the fed-
eral courts were restrained from permitting the operation of state
judicial initiative in resolving both constitutional and non-constitu-
tional issues. Fear of potential friction between federal and state
government, self-limitation growing out of the fear of disturbing
state programs and belief that state judiciaries are better equipped
to resolve issues arising within their jurisdictions lie at the root
of this self-restraint.
Why did the Court veer from its original application of the
doctrine? A representative list of reasons for refusing to abstain
provides the answer:
No potential federal-state friction,
No impairment of state policies or programs,
Difficulty of interpreting state law offers no justification
for deferring to state judges,
Abstention further delays solutions,
Abstention increases litigation costs,
Abstention doubles the judicial work load,
No further clarification of issue by state court possible,
Reliance upon viewpoint of lower federal tribunal,
Congressional policy favoring federal decision in diversity
of citizenship cases,
Judicial distaste offers no justification for abstaining in
diversity of citizenship cases,
Federal statutory policy authorizing federal judicial de-
cision,
Protection of a preferred constitutional right,
No vague or ambiguous state interpretation,
Need for unified national policy,
Abstention converts federal judiciary into a secondary ju-
dicial system,
Abstention encourages federal judicial inefficiency.
From an analysis of the reasons for refusals to abstain, two
major considerations motivate the majority of the Court. First,
in each of the subject areas the Court was faced with considera-
tions which justified the creation of exceptions to or delimitations
of the doctrine. In civil rights cases, its experience with state
court hostility towards protecting Negro civil rights in Monroe,
Garner, Bell, and Dombrowski left the Court with the alternative
of either protecting constitutional rights by refusing to abstain or
remanding the cases to the unlikely chance of state judicial pro-
tection.
In the field of public utility regulation, non-abstention has been
applied where a federal statute pre-empted the field, 2 " or where
an over-riding need existed for a unified national policy.129 In
the regulation of commerce, the lack of ambiguity of the ordinance
attacked 0 and the absence of federal disruption of state policy 31
permitted the Court to refuse to abstain. In taxation cases the
limited state protection of rights and the need for a unified na-
tional tax policy justified the exceptions to the rule. The burden
of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction imposed by the Constitu-
tion 132 and the need for unified national policy 133 were the prin-
cipal factors in the field of creditors' rights.
The second major factor in the Court's decision to refuse to
abstain is the added complications inherent in the doctrine. Fore-
most among these are the additional delays in securing a final
adjudication on the merits of the controversy and the added costs
of counsel fees and litigation expenses resulting from federal re-
tention of jurisdiction pending state court determination. The
doctrine results in splitting of the litigation, a procedural practice
which is inconsistent with modern objectives of consolidating re-
lated issues into one suit. The abstention principle also places a
tremendous burden upon the practitioner to exercise great caution
in framing his state court pleadings to avoid submitting a federal
issue for adjudication.
During the history of the doctrine its leading proponents have
included Mr. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Jackson. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justices Douglas, Brennan and White
have emerged as the principal opponents of the doctrine. Mr.
Justices Black, Rutledge, Roberts, Clark, Goldberg, and Whittaker
have provided support to both sides.
The onus of writing decisions in abstention cases has fallen
most heavily upon Mr. Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and
Reed together with Mr. Chief Justice Stone. Mr. Justices Frank-
furter, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart have been the most prolific
authors of concurring opinions. Mr. Justices Douglas, Black,
Frankfurter and Harlan have emerged as the principal authors of
dissents against the opinions of the Court.
Is the abstention doctrine dead by virtue of delimitation and
exception? The cumulative record of the disposition of abstention
pleadings and the review of the most recent cases indicate it is not.
The two major reasons for the original adoption of the doctrine, the
128. Public Util. Comm'n. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
129. Public Util. Comm'n. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
130. Chicago v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
131. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324
(1964).
132. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1945).
133. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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concept of self-limitation in the doctrine of judicial review and
the continuing presence of federalism as a constitutional issue,
insure its continued life.
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